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ABSTRACT

An assessment of civic education during the authoritarian regime of Francisco Franco in Spain (1939-1975) is presented along with a comparison of the regime's efforts with those of the United States. Franco's dictatorship was characterized by authoritarian values of subordination, obedience, perpetuation of power, and maintenance of the status quo. The "good" citizen was politically disinterested and apathetic. The schools, however, were not very successful in promoting the values desired by the government, partly because of the obvious discrepancies between what was being taught and the political, social, and economic realities of Spanish society. The curricular emphasis was on the ideals, theory, and structure of the organic state and a selective analysis of history which justified the Franco regime. As a result students became apathetic rather than successfully indoctrinated. The regime failed in gaining the allegiance of Spanish youth and in developing the elite which would perpetuate Francoism. In comparison, numerous civic education programs in the United States display weaknesses similar to those of Franco's Spain. Students are subjected to attempts to inculcate "American" political, social, and economic values. The discrepancy between the social world as it is and as portrayed in the classroom is often tremendous. Efforts in citizenship education have not prevented widespread political apathy among American youth or stemmed the tide of disrespect toward the most important institutions of our society. Finally, as in Spain, citizenship education programs have not been continually reassessed and modified. (Author/KC)

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DEFINING AND SHAPING THE GOOD CITIZEN IN AN AUTHORITARIAN STATE: CIVIC EDUCATION IN FRANCO'S SPAIN

SO 012 911

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Defining and Shaping the Good Citizen In An Authoritarian State: Civic Education In Franco's Spain

Introduction

The report issued by the National Task Force on Citizenship Education in 1977 and the many expressions of concern in recent pedagogical literature about the shortcomings of civic education in the United States underline the fact that our society is experiencing a serious problem with respect to the promotion of responsible citizenship.[1] As public awareness of the crisis in civic education increases so too will demands for an effective response to the problem by educators. However, if the forthcoming reaction is to significantly improve civic education programs, the temptation to rely on quick and simple remedies will have to be avoided.

The task facing those who must react to the crisis is one which calls for something more than a rush to introduce superficial curricular changes or to develop new materials and methods. What is required, prior to any curricular and methodological modifications, is a realistic reconceptualization of the role which can and should be played by the school and other institutions in the preparation of youth for citizenship. This reconceptualization should be based to a large extent upon a comprehensive assessment of political socialization research and a careful analysis of the educational implications of such research. Moreover, as part of that assessment it would seem useful to give some attention to the experiences of other societies as they have dealt with the perennial problem of defining and shaping the good citizen. In the midst of our own anxieties, soul searching, and brainstorming, such insights as might be gleaned from an evaluation of the civic education efforts of a variety of nations may prove to be of interest and value to American educators.

Admittedly, there are difficulties involved in such an endeavor, including the scarcity of data on civic education in many societies, particularly those which are neither democratic nor totalitarian in their political orientations. For example, almost no research has been conducted on the attempts of authoritarian societies to define and mold their versions of the good citizen. The fact that authoritarian governments are fairly numerous and that several have been quite long lived, suggests at least some measure of success in terms of their approach to the political education of their citizenry. It is impossible to know if there are important lessons to be learned from the civic education experiences of stable authoritarian states if we ignore those experiences. The following study is, therefore, an attempt to broaden the scope of civic education research and our understanding of a complex aspect of political socialization as well by examining both the process and the results of civic education in an authoritarian state.

One of the most durable authoritarian governments during the past half century was that of Francisco Franco, dictator of Spain from 1939 until his death in 1975. Since his demise a relatively rapid transition to a representative government has occurred and as a result it is now possible to gain access to information which during the dictatorship was unavailable. Thus, Spain has now become an excellent place to investigate various aspects of authoritarianism, including the authoritarian approach to civic education.

The Nature of Francoism

An analysis of any aspect of the political scene in Franco's Spain must necessarily commence with a brief description of the nature of the regime. This is particularly true with respect to civic education because the nature of Francoism was an important determinant of the political messages and related educational practices to which Spaniards were exposed for several decades.

Franco became the political leader of Spain as a result of his having commanded the rebel forces during a three year civil war which resulted in the collapse of the Second Republic in 1939. The victorious Nationalist army represented a variety of conservative and reactionary groups held together by their fear and hatred of a common enemy rather than the sharing of a common ideology. As a consequence of the divergence of political attitudes within the insurgent coalition, the justification for the uprising was little more than an appeal to tradition--the traditions which were supposedly responsible for Spain's glorious past, including militant Catholicism, and a vigorous rejection of the nontraditional forces which were blamed for Spain's decline--liberalism, socialism, communism, masonry, and anticlericalism.[2] Since the primary objective of most of the rebels was simply a return to the status quo ante Republic, the Nationalist cause did not suffer greatly during the war from the lack of a comprehensive ideology.

Throughout the civil war Franco refused to clarify his position as to the type of post-war government he intended to support, but when victory had been achieved he managed to transform what was originally a temporary position of military and political leadership into a long-lasting personal dictatorship. Recognizing that his position was somewhat tenuous, Franco always refused to rule through a single faction and relied instead upon an adroitly balanced coalition of several groups which he consistently manipulated against one another. This reliance on coalition politics plus his refusal to sanction an all powerful party for fear that it might dilute his own power or alienate some of the groups which supported him help explain why Spain did not become a rigid ideological state.[3]

There is not total agreement among scholars on all aspects of the Franco regime, but insofar as its ideological stance is concerned few disagree with Juan Linz's characterization of authoritarian governments, including Spain's, as being "without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities)."[4]

Others, including Stanley Payne and Kenneth Medhurst, have also emphasized Franco's preference for a general theory of authoritarianism rather than a vigorous ideological state.[5]

This is not to say, however, that there was no concern about ideology among supporters of the regime, or that no effort was directed towards the creation of an official ideology. Despite the various impediments to the careful formulation of a comprehensive ideology, spokesmen for the regime did manage to develop an explanation of and justification for the political, social, and economic order desired by many of the factions comprising Franco's coalition. It was not a particularly profound or elaborate ideology and the structure and policies of the regime were not always faithful to its tenets; yet it was useful for public consumption and propaganda purposes and it did serve as a means of justifying the authoritarian behavior of the government.

What ideology there was revolved around the authoritarian values of hierarchy, subordination, and obedience which were glorified by the regime as necessary components of a just and harmonious society. Since such a society supposedly could be achieved only within a political, social, and economic order which reflects such values, the concept of corporatism became the ideological framework of the regime.

The Spanish version of corporatism was termed the organic state and posited a social view of humanity wherein the State was metaphorically depicted as an organism whose several parts must function in an interdependent manner. Every individual belonged to each of the "natural" parts of society--the family, municipality, and sindicato--and his or her place within each of these units was a fact of birth which had to be accepted if the social objectives of the organic state were to be realized. Those who were superior by virtue of their natural abilities or training must be accepted as leaders by those who ranked below them in any of the units of society.[6]

The theory of the organic state was the basis for political and economic organization in Franco's Spain. The major objectives of the organic state -- peace, order, and harmony-- were to be achieved by eliminating class conflict and political parties. The hierarchy of classes would not disappear but conflict between them would be eliminated by creating a system wherein all classes would function cooperatively on behalf of the entire society rather than their own selfish interests. Thus, labor and management were combined in single organizations known as sindicatos which were to mitigate labor disputes and class conflict in keeping with the philosophy of the organic state.

Competition between political parties, which the regime identified with class conflict and political turmoil, was eliminated by channeling such political participation as was permitted through the family, municipality, and sindicato or professional organizations. Only the representatives of the legally recognized "natural" social units and of such institutions as the church, the military, and the Falange (Spanish fascist party which had little real power) were allowed to speak for the citizenry.

Defining and Shaping the Good Citizen

Having come to power via a bitter civil war and confronted by the continuing hostility of the defeated, particularly the working class, the Franco regime could not ignore the necessity of reorienting the political culture of the nation. During the initial years of the new regime its efforts to maintain social control and to gain popular acceptance, or at least toleration, reflected to some extent the totalitarian inclinations of the Falange and other groups among the Spanish Right. However as the Second World War drew to a close and the influence of the Falange waned, the totalitarian tendencies and rhetoric began to fade. Any chance that the regime would come to represent a form of revolutionary reactionism which would create a "new order" passed into oblivion, and the government settled into an authoritarian mold which would characterize it until Franco's death.

Consequently, a number of the more vigorous and blatant indoctrination efforts of the early years of the regime were dropped or relaxed and the process of civic education was thenceforth pursued in a somewhat different manner.[7]

The change in emphasis and approach, insofar as citizenship training was concerned, was necessitated by the fact that after its initial flirtation with totalitarianism had ended the regime's conception of the type of citizen it preferred underwent some modifications. Authoritarian regimes do not wish to produce either the informed and involved citizen deemed essential by democratic societies or the thoroughly indoctrinated ideologue desired by totalitarian leaders.[8] Given the overriding concern of regimes such as Franco's with the perpetuation of their own power and the maintenance of the status quo rather than with ideology, mass movements, participant politics, or missionary zeal, the good citizen is one who is politically disinterested and apathetic not one who is in any way politicized.

The process of reorienting the political culture and of reeducating the Spanish people politically involved several different but related objectives. The masses, particularly the volatile working class, had to be depoliticized in the interest of social control while at the same time a youthful elite loyal to the regime and its principles had to be developed as future replacements for those now in positions of leadership.[9] Moreover, the reorientation mandated that the citizenry eventually tolerate the system to a certain extent, or at least reject the major alternatives to authoritarianism, if the regime was to perpetuate itself and its principles indefinitely. Naturally, coercion or the constant threat of force would contribute to the maintenance of social order, but effective civic education could make the use of force with all of its attendant problems less necessary.

As in all dictatorial systems a variety of means were utilized by the Franco regime to shape the thinking and behavior of the citizenry. The press

was rigorously controlled and books, films, and television and radio emissions were likewise subject to both political and religious censorship.

From its inception the regime gave attention to the development of organizations concerned with the political socialization of youth. The Frente de Juventudes (Youth Front), created in 1940, was assigned several important functions on behalf of its members: overseeing political education, physical education and sports, premilitary training for males and training in homemaking for girls, religious education, and the organization of camps, courses, and academies. It was also given considerable control over those youth who did not voluntarily join its ranks. All students automatically became part of the Frente which was assigned responsibility for their instruction in politics and physical education.[10]

The Falange controlled most of the social services in Spain and assigned responsibility for such services primarily to the Sección Femenina (Female Section). This provided the Sección Femenina with tremendous opportunities for indoctrination as well as service. Girls who joined the youth organization of the Sección Femenina were given classes in religion, politics, physical education and a variety of other subjects. Girls who were not members were reached in their schools or places of employment by the instructors of Seccion Femenina who operated through the Frente de Juventudes. Female instructors also traveled to isolated areas in order to teach sanitation, homemaking, and politics to rural females.[11]

The Spanish church too had its youth groups and organizations for adults, and it provided chaplains for military units, assisted the Sección Femenina and the Frente de Juventudes, exercised censorship rights over films, books, and the press, and provided religious instruction in all schools. Given the fact that the church was for years one of the pillars of support for the regime, much of the effort it expended in activities such as those cited

above served to complement the civic education efforts of the government.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the channels utilized by the Franco regime to influence and control political thought and behavior, but it is sufficient to illustrate the fact that the government, operating through the military, schools, mass media, sindicatos, the National Movement, and the church, seized almost every possible opportunity to shape the type of citizenry it desired. However, despite the government's reliance on a variety of political socialization agents and its attempts to reorient the political attitudes and behavior of Spaniards of all ages, the long-range concerns of the regime with respect to civic education necessarily focused on the nation's youth. Therefore, it was the school which bore much of the responsibility for shaping the good citizen.

The School and Civic Education

One of the major goals of the leaders of the Second Republic was to improve the dismal educational system of Spain in the hope that the school would contribute to the development of a progressive and enlightened citizenry. However, the efforts to end the church's dominance in education, to offset elitism by expanding educational opportunities, and to liberalize and modernize the schools were strenuously opposed by conservatives and eventually eradicated by the victorious Nationalists after the civil war. Just as the Republic had sought to use the schools to achieve its liberal ends, the Franco regime now planned to utilize the educational system to produce citizens who would acquiesce in the reestablishment of a conservative political, social, and economic order.

Unlike the similar regimes of Salazar in Portugal or Mussolini in Italy, the Spanish government granted the church a tremendous amount of power in the field of education. Part of the reason for doing so was the financial relief thus obtained by the Franco regime which was hard pressed for funds.

Then, too, the church's extravagant demands with respect to education had a great deal of support from most conservatives because they perceived Catholicism as being intrinsically linked to the traditions they believed to be responsible for Spain's glorious past. Moreover, the conservative political attitudes of the ecclesiastical leadership, the Spanish church's silence on most social issues, and its commitment to authority and hierarchy meant that Catholic educational influence would doubtless contribute to the regime's objective of a depoliticized and apathetic citizenry.[12]

Perhaps, the primary reason for the government's educational concessions to the church, however, was Franco's need for Catholic endorsement. Because of his close association with the Axis powers he found it necessary to refurbish his image within the international community after the Second World War. The church cooperated with Franco's plan to use its support as a means of legitimizing his regime but not without a price. The ecclesiastical hierarchy expected a quid pro quo which was obviously granted as was demonstrated by the increase in the power and prestige of the church after 1945, particularly in educational affairs.[13]

Whatever the reasons, the church was granted a near monopoly in education. Religious instruction was compulsory at all levels of schooling, and even the universities were directed to adapt their teaching to Catholic dogma and morality. Not only were a majority of schools parochial but Catholic influence was extended into the public schools through religious classes, the requirement that all secular teachers complete a course in religion, and the church's supervisory right over all textbooks. The church was also permitted to create its own normal schools, to inspect all instruction concerning faith and customs in both public and private schools, and was granted state funds to be used for educational purposes. Furthermore, the upper echelons of the Ministry of Education were almost always

staffed by those who supported the church's deep involvement in the educational system.[14]

Given the limits of space it is impossible to adequately treat even the most important pieces of educational legislation of the Franco regime. However, it is rather easy to denote the elitist nature of many of the laws which governed Spanish education. The most significant educational legislation issued by the Nationalists during the civil war, the Ley de la Reforma de la Segunda Enseñanza (Law for the Reform of Secondary Education), set the tone for educational policy in Franco's Spain for years to come. Two aspects of the law made it obvious that education was to contribute to the maintenance of the traditional social structure. First, it permitted the creation of private schools, most of which would be parochial, and it provided such schools with state financial support. Because of their relatively high tuitions private schools were meant for the well-to-do. Secondly, the curriculum prescribed by the law was classical in nature, thus reflecting the traditional Spanish perception of secondary education as being primarily for the future directive class.[15]

The Ley de Instrucion Primaria (Law of Primary Instruction), passed in 1945, made primary education obligatory for children between the ages of six and twelve, but it was largely a sham because there were neither enough teachers nor facilities to service all the members of this age group. Furthermore, the secondary curriculum was not a natural extension of the primary curriculum. Thus, secondary education, which was not obligatory, continued to be viewed as preparation for the university and entrance into the Spanish political and economic elite rather than a logical extension of primary education.[16]

In 1953 a rather significant revision of the curriculum was legislated, and this was followed by further minor modifications throughout the 1950s.

The elementary and secondary curriculums were made more compatible, the fixed nature of the curriculum and its classical emphasis were somewhat reduced, and at least part of secondary education was made compulsory. However, secondary education was still thought of as useful only for those who would go on to the universities and the new curriculum was not particularly attractive to the children of the working class or those living in rural areas. Problems of space and quality in the public schools remained severe, and the great majority of those enrolled in secondary education were in private schools.[17]

Not until the economic boom of the 1960s and the recognition by the regime of the economic implications of human resource development did the government begin to make a major effort to provide sufficient educational facilities for the masses. The building program was impressive but not adequate, and the elitist nature of the educational system was still evident during the last years of the regime despite the initiation of several important reforms in 1970.

In addition to the elitist and Catholic orientation of the educational system in Franco's Spain, mention must also be made of the authoritarian tenor of the schools both in terms of what was taught and the manner in which it was taught. It is impossible to capture and accurately describe the atmosphere of a typical classroom in Spain during the Franco era, but such sources as textbooks, curriculum guides, lists of approved books, and statements made by former students provide some insight into the authoritarian milieu of the Spanish school.

Within a month of the outbreak of the civil war the Nationalist leadership began to impose authoritarian values upon the schools in the territory captured from the Republic. Among the steps taken between 1936 and the end of the war in 1939 were the purging of educational personnel whose loyalty to the rebellion was suspect, the abolition of co-education, the establishment

of obligatory courses in religion in all schools, and the adoption of strict requirements concerning the publication of textbooks. Circulars were issued periodically by the Nationalist government directing teachers to develop the moral and religious implications to be found in their lectures at every opportunity and to constantly emphasize the greatness of Spain and the exalted nature of the National Movement.[18] When the war ended these measures were, of course, applied throughout Spain.

In describing the nature of education in Spain following the civil war Luis Carandell has stated, "Patriotic education and religious education, indissoluably united, were the essential nucleus of an education in which the precepts of the morality of national catholicism had priority over knowledge."[19] Another recent publication concerning Spanish education bears out Carandell's criticism and adds, "Dogmatism, memorization, obedient submission...are the variables of the teaching of those years."[20]

Such authoritarian methods were associated with the teaching of all subjects to a certain extent, but they were most evident in the compulsory courses in religion, history, and political education. Religious studies quite often consisted of little more than memorizing and reciting such reactionary catechisms as the one authored by Father Ripalda much of which was devoted to acquainting Spanish youth with the principal "errors" condemned by the church: materialism, Darwinism, atheism, pantheism, deism, rationalism, protestantism, socialism, communism, liberalism, modernism, and masonry. The Nueva Ripalda provided facile answers to the complex problems which had long confronted Spain and relied heavily on stereotyping and scapegoating.[21]

A selective analysis of history was another hallmark of the Spanish school. Spanish history was presented as nothing less than an imperial mission ordained and directed by God. Spain's spiritual and cultural superiority were emphasized, and her heroes were depicted as a mixture of wise and

dedicated rulers, saints, and warriors while her enemies were atheistic, materialistic foreigners or Spaniards who had succumbed to false philosophies of foreign origin. Franco was described as the savior of the nation and its holy traditions and the man of destiny who would continue to carry out Spain's historic mission.[22] As Nuccio has pointed out, the regime relied heavily on a very selective analysis of history as "proof" of its validity and appropriateness.[23]

In addition to the pervasive religious emphasis in their education and their exposure to an extremely biased treatment of Spanish history, students were also required to take political education courses. Girls were taught by instructors from the Falange's Sección Femenina and boys by teachers provided by the Frente de Juventudes. They received instruction in the doctrines of the Falange, the organic state and Spanish history with a great deal of attention being given to such values as hierarchy, social order, obedience, and patriotism. Official textbooks were provided as were numerous guides for teachers explaining how the texts and other recommended activities were to be used and to what ends.

A number of books and articles dealing with education during the Franco era have appeared in Spain since the dictator's death, and many of them comment on the repressive atmosphere of the schools, particularly during the first two decades of the regime. The "purified" corps of authoritarian teachers, strictly enforced codes of behavior, heavily censored texts, constant political and religious indoctrination, an emphasis on rote memorization, the segregation of students by sex and by social class, and a great deal of sexual repression are frequently mentioned characteristics of the educational experience of those who were students during the 1940s and 1950s.[24]

For a variety of reasons the authoritarian and elitist features of the educational system were softened somewhat during the latter years of the Franco regime. Of some importance was the fact that the ecclesiastical hierarchy began to move away from its symbiotic relationship with the regime following

Vatican Council II. Consequently, religious education gradually began to reflect the liberal mood of the progressive wing of the church and this eventually resulted in a less oppressive atmosphere in many schools.

However, it was the reorientation of the government's economic policies during the 1960s and 1970s which was most responsible for changes in education. Early in 1957 Franco rejected any further reliance on the outmoded economic advice of the Falange and entrusted economic affairs to several development-oriented technocrats. It was the commitment of these technocrats to the development of an educational system capable of furnishing sufficient people with the skills necessary to rapid industrialization that led to a heightened concern for scientific and technical training and the gradual diminishment of some of the ideological, authoritarian, and elitist emphasis of the schools.[26] Moreover, as economic growth was realized, the regime could be less concerned with indoctrination because it now had an additional strategy to promote social control. As Frederick Pike has noted:

> The continuing nonpoliticization of Spanish youth and the masses in general depends upon keeping the majority of Spaniards economically impotent and manipulated through a system of consumerism, and also of forced savings, that effectively siphons off their money as quickly as it is earned....Under Franco the Spanish government has unhesitatingly assumed its paternalistic obligations to the economically and dependent masses, thereby moving to perpetuate that dependency....[27]

This, says Pike, "explains why the directing elites in Spain have been correct in their basic assumption that economic development need not lead to democracy...."[28]

By the latter part of the 1960s the numerous shortcomings of the educational system had become a source of serious discontent not only among the Spanish public but also among the technocrats who were engineering Spain's "economic miracle." Since many of the regime's important figures had now come

to recognize the potential of economic growth in terms of the contributions it could make to social control and stability, there was less reluctance to sanction further changes in the educational system.

In 1969 the Ministry of Education and Science released a report based on an extensive study of educational problems in Spain. Officially entitled La Educación en España: Bases para una política educativa, the report was commonly known as the Libro Blanco (White Book).[29] The first part of the Libro Blanco was a devastating criticism of the outmoded and inflexible education system characterized by elitism, limited funds and facilities, poor textbooks and teaching methods, and a lack of articulation between the various levels of schooling. The second part of the report outlined a new system of education designed to eliminate these problems. After a period of public consultation and considerable debate in the Cortes (parliament), the new educational plan and funding for it were approved in August 1970. However, at the time of Franco's death five years later the Spanish educational system was still the target of numerous criticisms. Insufficient funding for education, the continued lack of facilities, poorly paid teachers, and remnants of authoritarianism and elitism had not been totally eliminated by the reforms of 1970.

The Impact of Civic Education

Those who are familiar with both the literature on political socialization and the complexities of Spanish political culture will, no doubt, appreciate the difficulties involved in demonstrating a direct correlation between the civic education efforts of the Franco regime and the characteristic political attitudes and behavior of the Spanish people. Despite such difficulties, it does seem possible to arrive at some general conclusions as to the efficacy of the regime's attempts to achieve certain ends through civic education. However, the fact that the Franco government's political socialization goals, priorities, and methods did not remain constant

throughout its tenure makes it necessary to comment upon changes in the regime's intent before assessing the success or failure of its efforts.

As has been noted, the totalitarian rhetoric and the blatant indoctrination which characterized the regime's approach to political education immediately after the civil war were eventually softened as the government found itself confronted by international complications and the hard realities of the Spanish political scene. Given the necessity of refurbishing its tarnished image in the international community after the Second World War, the difficulties involved in Franco's reliance on coalition politics, the lack of an omnipotent single party and a comprehensive ideology, and the desire to suppress the embittered working class, it is rather obvious why the depolitization of the masses rather than their mobilization was accepted by the regime as the more realistic goal. As Linz notes in describing the situation in Spain, "...regimes coming to power after periods of considerable political strife, lack of consensus under democratic governments and aborted revolutions: all these will tend to use apathy to consolidate their power...."[30] Having veered away from the totalitarian tendencies of the early 1940s, the Franco government now became committed to the social control tactics characteristic of authoritarian regimes -- depolitization combined with coercion when necessary.

Even though such factors as economic modernization and consumerism may have become more important than civic education in the development of political apathy during the 1960s, formal efforts to shape the good citizen were never entirely abandoned because of their potential contribution to the achievement of several objectives which were closely related to the regime's primary concern of self preservation. The civic education programs of the schools and youth groups in particular were intended to contribute to the process of depolitication by inculcating the authoritarian principles of the

organic state. Such efforts would help also to legitimize the regime and its principles in the thinking of the citizenry, and would promote the development of a youthful elite which must eventually replace the veterans of the Franco government in key positions. The accomplishment of these ends became increasingly important as Franco grew older and concern mounted within the regime as to how Francoism was to be maintained after the demise of the dictator.

Not only is it apparent that depolitization of the masses was the major social control tactic of the Spanish government, but it is equally clear that the regime was successful in achieving it. Despite the lack of quantitative data relating to levels of political interest in Spain during the two decades following the civil war, a number of Spanish and foreign observers have attested to the fact that prior to 1956 even university students, who were eventually to become the most politicized group in Spain, were not politically oriented.[31] The disturbances which occurred at the universities in 1956 were definitely a turning point in the political thinking of some Spanish youth but Raymond Carr, writing ten years later, stated that even at that late date "the majority of students have little enthusiasm for political activity" despite their growing political interest and awareness.[32] It is probably safe to assume that much the same type of political apathy was characteristic of most other groups in Spain during this period.

The earliest large-scale empirical study in Spain which touched upon political attitudes was commissioned by the Delegación Nacional de Juventudes in 1960. Those surveyed included 1500 males and 500 females between the ages of 16 and 20 who had been selected from 13 geographical zones. The sample was comprised of students, laborers, and peasants. Although the political questions which made up part of the survey were not as probing as they might have been, they were superior to what one would expect to be permitted in an authoritarian state. The results, insofar as political

knowledge and interest were concerned, indicated a very low level of information accompanied by passive attitudes of acceptance, submission, and apathy.[33]

In 1972 J. R. Torregrosa Perris, professor of sociology at the University of Madrid, analyzed the results of three attitudinal studies conducted in 1968 and 1969. One study involved a representative sample of Spaniards between the ages of 15 and 29, the second a sample of the population over the age of 18, and the third a sample of university students from six university districts. With respect to the levels of political interest and knowledge, Torregrosa concluded that they were quite low among youth and not much higher among the population in general.[34]

The most comprehensive analysis of attitudinal studies in Spain was completed by Antonio Lopez Pina and Eduardo Aranguren in 1976. After reviewing the results of seven studies conducted between 1960 and 1973, including two of those cited above, Lopez Pina and Aranguren drew the same basic conclusions as Torregrosa: "The replies speak for themselves, documenting in all their dimensions the absence of the great mass of the population from the political arena."[35] The studies revealed a great deal of political inertia and an impressive lack of information and interest in the political system.[36]

Relatively late in the Franco era publication of the results of a national poll conducted by I.C.S.A. - Gallup added to the collection of evidence concerning depolitization in Spain. The poll was conducted monthly from January 1971 through November 1973 and the results indicated that only 5.5 percent of the polulation was politicized, 31 percent were susceptible to eventual politicization, 55.3 percent were depoliticized, and 7.0 percent could not be categorized.[37]

Virtually all of the available evidence then points to extremely widestread depolitization in Franco's Spain. It would be ridiculous to attribute

the high level of political apathy and disinterest solely to the government's political education efforts, but it would be equally absurd to assume that such widespread efforts did not have an effect.

While it is almost impossible to ascertain the extent to which civic education contributed to the depolitization of Spaniards, it is not particularly difficult to determine that neither civic education nor any of the other tactics used by the Franco regime were very successful in achieving the additional objectives which were perceived as being necessary to the preservation of the status quo. In fact there is an overwhelming amount of evidence which indicates that the government's efforts to promote the legitimization of the regime, to popularize authoritarian attitudes, and to develop a loyal youthful elite were by and large failures.

Dionisio Ridruejo, Lain Entralgo, and Amando de Miguel, as well as a number of foreign scholars, have commented on the failure of schools and youth groups to do much more than promote disinterest and apathy among Spanish youth insofar as politics was concerned.[38] Germani, in one of the few studies ever conducted on political socialization in Spain, concluded that the failure of the regime to successfully indoctrinate Spanish youth derived primarily from the tremendous discrepancy between the Falange's social ideals, which were constantly lauded in the schools and youth groups, and the obvious lack of achievement in terms of social reform. The routinization and bureaucratization which became hallmarks of the Franco regime eventually led to the alienation of most youth-- an alienation which came to be expressed in apathy or passive conformity on the part of many or rebellion among the few who became highly politicized.[39]

Despite the constant efforts of the regime to popularize the authoritarian organic state and to denigrate such democratic principles as civil liberties, political parties, and popular political participation as well as

a variety of economic ideas generally associated with socialism, the several empirical studies conducted since 1960 show rather clearly that such efforts were not very effective, particularly among young people. For example, in the youth study of 1960 the participants were asked to select from a list of eight choices the form of government with which they were most sympathetic. Although a monarchy (which Franco had declared Spain to be), an authoritarian regime, and an organic democracy were included in the list, the most popular choice by far was a presidential republic like that of the United States which received the support of 35 percent of the males and 24 percent of the females.[40] Moreover, a question relating to the most appropriate economic structure indicated a tendency in favor of some type of collectivization without state ownership.[41]

Five years later in July 1965 a National Congress of Youth organized by Spanish Catholic Action was attended by 2000 young people who released a statement at the conclusion of the meeting which made it very clear that the majority of those in attendance rejected the political philosophy of Francoism. The statement called for free associations, free and open means of communication, some means of dialog between youth and the authorities based on authentic representation, a democratization of civic organization, and political education promoting the service of youth to society.[42]

A review of the data contained in the three attitudinal surveys of 1968 and 1969 also supports the contention that the regime's political socialization efforts were largely ineffective. On the basis of that data Torregrosa concluded that, "There exists in ample sectors of Spanish youth a favorable attitude toward an important change in the political organization of Spain...."[43] Included in the desired change were such factors as "political structures which were less authoritarian, more open to the participation of all, free, less subject to the influence and minority control of a few groups, more just, and definitely more authentically democratic."[44] Furthermore, the

1968 study, like the survey of 1960, revealed socialist inclinations among ample sections of Spanish youth.[45]

The most ambitious attempt to gauge Spanish political attitudes was carried out in 1969 by the Fundación FOESSA. Data were compiled from representative samples of the members of households throughout Spain and were supplemented by additional information derived from interviews with students, workers, and professional men in Madrid. The results were to be included in a lengthy sociological study of Spanish society published in 1970 but due to official censorship the political section had to be omitted from the study.

The results of the FOESSA surveys of political opinion, which would have been much more widely disseminated than previous attitudinal surveys had they been published in the sociological study, indicate why the political section was censored by the regime. The data gathered in Madrid were of particular significance because they pointed to increasingly liberal political tendencies on the part of those with above average educations, especially those under 35 years of age with a university background. Large numbers of this group favored a republican form of government and believed that political parties were necessary to the development of a Spanish democracy. Considerable support was evidenced for such parties as Social Democrats, Socialists, and Christian Democrats. Moreover, they were the largest group consistently in opposition to the regime's position on most issues and were also the most highly politicized.[46] These were the "new elite" of Franco's Spain, those who had enjoyed the greatest educational opportunities and who therefore had been thoroughly exposed to the civic education efforts of the organic state, yet they were the least loyal to the principles of Francoism.

An analysis of several national and local public opinion surveys conducted in Spain between 1960 and 1970 was presented by Rafael Lopez-Pintor, director of the Instituto de la Opinión Pública in Madrid, at the national meeting of

the Latin American Studies Association in Atlanta in 1976. Lopez-Pintor stated that the data revealed that political interest in Spain, while still not high, was increasing, and that authoritarianism among the populace was declining, particularly among males born after the civil war. He also concluded that the extremely authoritarian and conservative views which constituted the ideological basis of the Franco regime were held by only a small portion of Spaniards who were interested in politics.[47]

The obvious failure of the regime's civic education efforts to achieve its objectives, aside from widespread depolitization, was paralleled to a large extent by the lack of success experienced by the conservatives in the ecclesiastical hierarchy who equated militant, traditional Spanish Catholicism with patriotism and who sought to utilize the Catholic educational monopoly to ensure the loyalty of Spanish youth to the teachings of both church and state. Given the symbiotic relationship between the Franco regime and the Spanish church, the infusion of traditional Catholic social and moral philosophy into the regime's ideology, the important political positions held by conservative Catholics, and the extent of Catholic control of the educational system, the church was for many years in a position to exercise tremendous influence over the political socialization process.

However, the decade of the 1960s was a period of rapid and extremely significant change in Spain--change which impacted radically on the traditional mode of Spanish life and resulted in important alterations in social, political, and religious attitudes. Economic modernization, an expanding tourist industry, urbanization, the growth of the middle class, and an increasing emphasis on consumerism, all had a liberalizing and secularizing effect on Spain. Moreover, the aggiornamento of the Catholic church, combined with the successful efforts of the Vatican to modify the composition of the conservative Spanish episcopate, gradually enabled progressive clerics to begin the process of divorcing the Church of Spain from the Franco regime.

The cumulative effect of these modernizing trends was such that the religious attitudes of many Spaniards, especially the young, underwent a metamorphosis. Despite the church's widespread involvement in the educational system, it was unable to stem the tide of increasing secularism and theological and political liberalism. Salvador Giner in describing the situation notes that,

> The number of students who, in spite of the nature of their early education, began to abandon Catholicism grew steadily.... Secular and hedonistic attitudes made considerable inroads in the students' mentality....The overall trend initiated during this period was towards a greater modernity of approach to every aspect of life, religion, sexual mores, social inequality, individual achievement, science. By and large, then, it is necessary to conclude that the ideological victory of the regime in this field, while costly, had been ephemeral.[48]

Data gathered during the 1960s and 1970s point rather clearly to the fact that religious faith and practice were on the decline in Spain. Increasing numbers of people no longer believed in hell or life after death and expressed support for religious liberty, the right to obtain divorces, and optional rather than obligatory religion classes in the schools.[49] The church's loss of influence among the young was particularly apparent. A 1972 survey of those who taught religious classes to children 14 through 16 years of age revealed that 66 percent affirmed that many of their students had difficulty accepting the obligation of attending Sunday mass and 60 percent said the same was true concerning confession. Thirty-nine percent maintained that their students found it difficult to accept the church's position on divorce while 38 percent made the same point with respect to the baptism of children. Thirty-seven percent commented on the students' resistance to the doctrine of papal infallibility, and 20 percent said the same was true of the virginity of Mary.[50] Figures obtained in a national youth survey conducted in 1975 showed that only 32.5 percent of the survey population considered themselves to be good or practicing Catholics while 38 percent stated they were either indifferent to religion or

non-practicing Catholics.[51]

In 1976 the Spanish sociologist, Amando de Miguel, described what he refers to as "the failure of a massive indoctrination" in 40 Million Spaniards 40 Years After.[52] That he was able to publish a work so critical of the Franco government less than a year after the dictator's death without repercussions testifies eloquently to the fact that the efforts of the regime to mold the citizenry in such a way as to ensure the perpetuation of its authoritarian principles even after the demise of Franco had obviously failed. The successful depolitization of Spanish society had contributed heavily to the preservation of the regime for nearly four decades, but the combination of modernizing influences and the inability of the government's civic education efforts to popularize authoritarianism or to recruit a cadre of loyalists to replace the older Francoists literally dictated the simultaneous death of Franco and Francoism. While the efforts of the new political leadership to move Spain away from its authoritarian past have not gone forward without some difficulty, it is very apparent to those who are familiar with Spain that the great majority of the Spanish people do not mourn the passing of Francoism.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of the successes and failures of the Franco regime's civic education efforts does not, of course, provide us with a set of definitive answers to the many problems involved in the process of promoting responsible citizenship in our own society. Yet, the Spanish experience does raise serious questions concerning the efficacy of certain educational practices that were prevalent in Franco's Spain and which are common in the United States as well. Moreover, the assessment of civic education in Spain also tends to further confirm the accuracy of several of the most frequent criticisms of the attempts made by American educators to define and shape the good citizen.

While a considerable number of insights relevant to American education can be derived from the Franco regime's experience with civic training, limitations of space make it necessary to restrict the following discussion to a few issues which have the most important implications for those concerned with the improvement of citizenship education in the United States. It is hoped that further implications for civic education in this country, in addition to those dealt with below, have been suggested to the reader by the analysis of the Franco government's approach to citizenship training.

Perhaps the most significant lesson which can be drawn from the Franco regime's civic education efforts is the fact that the school and other institutions were not very effective in promoting the particular values desired by the government, at least in part, because of the obvious discrepancies between what was being taught and the political, social, and economic realities of Spanish society. The numerous required courses in history, political education, and religion were intended to indoctrinate not enlighten, and the same was true of the activities of the various secular and religious youth organizations. The curricular emphasis was on the ideals, theory, and structure of the organic state, the eternal conflict between the forces of good and evil, and a selective analysis of history which justified the existence and policies of the Franco regime. No attempt was made to help students understand how the political and economic systems actually functioned, to engage them in a realistic analysis on the nation's problems, or to assist them in the development of the intellectual skills necessary to an objective assessment of the Spanish social order.

Spanish children could not, however, be kept perpetually ignorant of the inequities, flaws, and conflicts within their society which made a

mockery of the indoctrination they received in school and various youth organizations. The glaring discrepancies between the social world depicted by the organs of the regime and the realities they observed outside the classroom contributed significantly to the widespread political apathy and cynicism that characterized Spanish youth.

The problems experienced by the government in its attempt to define and shape the good citizen also stemmed in part from the fact that its civic education objectives were somewhat incompatible. As noted before, the regime's primary objective was to depoliticize the masses in the interest of social control. At the same time, however, it was hoped that the successful inculcation of particular values would ensure the continuity of the regime and its principles indefinitely and would produce a youthful elite committed to Francoism which would become the future directive class of Spain. There is no doubt that Spanish youth were depoliticized as the government desired, but it appears that their political disinterest and apathy were largely attributable to their recognition of the discrepancies cited above rather than the effectiveness of the school and youth organizations in promoting the authoritarian values of the organic state. Most students were simply "turned off" rather than successfully indoctrinated. Consequently, the regime did not succeed in gaining the allegiance of Spanish youth to its principles or in developing the elite which could be trusted to perpetuate Francoism.

Unfortunately, numerous civic education programs in the United States display weaknesses similar to those of Franco's Spain. One need only review a recent study of the status of social studies education in this country or the report of the National Task Force on Citizenship Education to be made painfully aware of this.[53] Many of our children continue to be subjected to attempts to inculcate a set of "American" political, social, and economic

values which are considered the basis of good citizenship. Civics and history courses, the "backbone" of formal citizenship education, concentrating as they generally do on governmental structure, political theory, and factual minutia, have proven to be extremely ineffectual in promoting either understanding or internalization of basic democratic values. Textbooks remain the major source of knowledge and the central instrument of instruction despite the fact that most are notoriously poor as a source of knowledge or as a means of aiding students in the development of the skills necessary to a thoughtful, responsible, and active participant in the democratic process. The discrepancy between the social world as it is and as portrayed in the classroom is often enormous, and there is considerable evidence that Americans are not deeply committed to the values advocated in the schools or prepared to deal effectively and responsibly with the serious social problems in the world beyond the classroom.[54]

Unlike citizenship training in Franco's Spain, the civic education programs of American schools are intended to combat rather than promote depolitization. Such efforts have not, however, prevented widespread political apathy among American youth nor stemmed the rising tide of disrespect toward the most important institutions of our society. Indeed, the failure of the schools to bring what is taught into line with objective social reality, their heavy reliance on indoctrination and the authoritative textbook, and their lack of attention to critical thinking skills may well have contributed to the dismal situation. Moreover, the politically irrelevant education to which many students are exposed has not succeeded in promoting a solid commitment to American values or in preparing youth for the responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic society.

Another glaring weakness of the Franco regime's approach to civic education which militated against its success was the lack of constant

attention and emphasis given the program, especially in the schools. As the priorities of the government shifted from time to time, particularly during the period when economic development was being emphasized and various educational reforms which reflected the economic concerns of the government were being planned or initiated, civic education programs in the schools received less and less attention. The programs were not pursued with the zeal of former years and were not continually reassessed and modified. Consequently, their impact does not appear to have been as great during the last decade of the regime as during the preceeding years.

Civic education has received somewhat similar treatment in the United States since the Second World War. The heavy emphasis on citizenship education which characterized the war years carried over into the 1950s as a result of the cold war crusade against communism. However, during the 1960s and early 1970s several new forces drove civic education from our list of top priorities. With the rise of student unrest and activism traditional partiotism was called into question and the "new social studies" tended to downgrade civic education in favor of other considerations.[55] After a decade or more of neglect, citizenship education has surfaced once again as a major concern among those who are disturbed by the results of that neglect among American youth. Both the Spanish and American experiences indicate the necessity of constant emphasis and attention to civic education programs if they are to be effective.

In conclusion, some mention must be made of those primarily responsible for formal instruction in civic education. In many respects it is the teacher who is the key to the significance of a given subject for any student. Yet in the schools of Franco's Spain and in numerous American schools as well the potential effectiveness of citizenship education has been seriously impaired by the low level of interest or competence of the teachers involved. Spanish

teachers of political education, history, and religion were often either party hacks (representatives of the Frente de Juventudes or the Sección Femenina taught political education courses), or woefully underpaid and poorly trained but loyal purveyors of historical distortions, or representatives of an institution which was supportive of the regime (teachers of religion were priests). Consequently, they were generally not held in very high esteem by students and were not particularly effective as teachers.

While American teachers of courses involving civic education, primarily social studies teachers, cannot be compared to those of Franco's Spain, it does not seem unfair to say that the social studies staff of many schools in the United States is quite often among the weakest groups comprising the faculty. As long as public school administrators assume that anyone with enough training to satisfy the minimum certification requirement can teach social studies, particularly coaches, and so long as the training of most social studies teachers continues to ignore or slight the type of preparation which will improve the competence of those engaged in citizenship education there is little hope that the school will begin to make a significant contribution to the promotion of responsible citizenship.

There are a large number of shortcomings in our present civic education efforts which must be addressed by those attempting to reconceptualize the role which can and should be played by the school and other institutions in the preparation of American youth for citizenship. Hopefully, the assessment of civic education in Franco's Spain has pointed to at least a few of the more significant problems and pitfalls with which we must come to grips.

Notes

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[3]Kenneth Medhurst, Government in Spain: The Executive at Work (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973), pp. 60-75.

[4]Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, eds. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 255.

[5]Medhurst, Government in Spain, pp. 27-28; Stanley Payne, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 224.

[6]Richard A. Nuccio, The Socialization of Political Values: The Content of Official Education in Spain (University of Massachusetts: Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1977), pp. 79-100.

[7]Gino Germani, "Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain," in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society, eds. Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 359-62.

[8]Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 8-9; 60-61.

[9]Gino Germani, Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain," pp. 367-68; A. Lopez Pina and E. Aranguren, La Cultura Política de la España de Franco (Madrid: Taurus Ediciones, 1976), pp. 63-72.

[10]The text of the law creating the Frente de Juventudes is contained in Fernandez Díaz-Plaja, La España Franquista en sus Documentos (Barcelona: Plaza and Janes, 1976), pp. 76-80.

[11]Sección Femenina, La Sección Femenina: Historia y Organización (Madrid: Sección Femenina, 1952), pp. 39-49.

[12]J. C. Fusi, "Educación en la España de Franco," pp. 15-16. (Unpublished manuscript by a Spanish historian which will be included in a forthcoming book on Franco's Spain to be edited by Raymond Carr).

[13]Juan J. Ruiz-Rico, El papel político de la Iglesia Católica en la España de Franco (Madrid: Tecnos, 1977), pp. 104-13.

[14]Amando de Miguel, Sociología del Franquismo (Barcelona: Editorial Euros, 1975), pp. 207-13.

[15]"Ley de la Reforma de la Segunda Enseñanza," Boletín Oficial del Estado (September-October, 1938), pp. 1385-95.

[16]"Ley de 17 de Julio de 1945 sobre Educación Primaria," Boletín Oficial del Estado (July 1945), pp. 385-416.

[17]Aubert J. Clark, "The Reform of Secondary Education In Spain," Comparative Education Review, 9 (February 1965), 27-30.

[18]Clyde L. Clark, The Evolution of the Franco Regime (Private publication of the U. S. Government, n. d.) Vol. 1, pp. 34-35; 111-13.

[19]Luis Carandell, "La Escuela y la Patria," Cuadernos para el Diálogo, No. 196 (29 January-4 February 1977), 30.

[20]Fernando Martínez Pareda et al., Educación y Sociedad, Vol. 2 (Madrid: Editorial Ayuso, 1977), p. 13.

[21]Marjorie Carlson and Robert Beck, "Education of Spanish Youth," The Educational Forum, 13 (November 1948), 33-38.

[22]A review of even a few of the textbooks used in history and political education classes, particularly those published by the Sección Femenina or the Frente de Juventudes, quickly reveals the heavy reliance on a very selective analysis of Spanish history.

[23]Nuccio, The Socialization of Political Values: The Content of Official Education in Spain, pp. 163-64.

[24]See, for example, V. Bozal et. al., eds., La Enseñanza en España (Madrid: Felmar, 1975), pp. 119-26; Amando de Miguel, 40 millones de españoles 40 años después (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1976), pp. 179-91; Martínez Pareda et al., Educación y Sociedad, pp. 11-15; Mariano Pérez Galán, "La enseñanza en los años cuarenta," Cuadernos para el Diálogo, Extra No. 34 (April 1973), 83-86; José M. Siles and Antonio Sanchez, "La escuela Franquista," Interviu, Nos. 60, 61, 63 (July 7, July 14, July 28, 1977), 38-42, 64-67, 76-79; Cuadernos para el Diálogo, No. 196 (January 29, 1977), pp. 30-37.

[25]Frank S. Riddel, "The Transformation of Church-State Relations in Spain During the Franco Era," International Review of History and Political Science, 15 (Winter 1978), 69-79.

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[28]Ibid., p. 194.

[29]La Educación en España: Bases para una política educativa (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, 1969).

[30]Linz, An Authoritarian Regime: Spain, p. 260.

[31]Comments by several eminent Spaniards and excerpts from various Falangist youth publications pertaining to the political apathy of Spanish youth can be found in Germani, "Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain," pp. 363-65. See also Salvador Giner, "Power Freedom and Social Change in the Spanish University, 1939-75," in Spain In Crisis, ed. Paul Preston (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976), pp. 183-90; Elena de la Souchère, An Explanation of Spain, trans. Eleanor R. Levieux (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 364.

[32]Raymond Carr, "The New Generation In Spain's Universities," Contemporary Review, 207 (December 1975), 295.

[33]Luis Buceta Facorro, La juventud ante los problemas sociales (Madrid: Doncel, 1976), pp. 13-14.

[34]J. R. Torregrosa Perris, La Juventud Española: Conciencia generacional y política (Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1972), p. 232.

[35]A. Lopez Pina and E. Aranguren, La Cultura Política de la España de Franco, p. 71.

[36]Ibid., pp. 63-72.

[37]"Los Españoles y la Política," Informaciones (Madrid), 15 February 1974, pp. 10-12.

[38]Dionisio Ridruejo, Escrito en España (Madrid: G. Del Toto, 1976), pp. 269-71; P. Laín Entralgo, El Problema De La Universidad (Madrid: Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1968), p. 94; Amando de Miguel, 40 millones de españoles 40 años después, pp. 201-47; Medhurst, Government in Spain, p. 169; Germani, "Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist REgimes; Italy and Spain."

[39]Germani, "Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain," pp. 362-63.

[40]Buceta Facorro, La juventud antes los problemas sociales, pp. 359-66.

[41]Ibid., pp. 125-30.

[42]Gabriel Elorriaga, "La juventud" in La España de los Años 70, Vol. 3, El Estado y la Política, eds. Manuel Fraga Iribarne et al. (Madrid: Editorial Moneda y Credito, 1974), pp. 429-30.

[43]Torregrosa Perris, La Juventud Española, p. 234.

[44]Ibid., p. 235.

[45]Ibid., p. 234.

[46]Amando de Miguel, "Spanish Political Attitudes, 1970," trans. Ann K Fleming and Shannon Fleming, in Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain, ed. Stanley G. Payne (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), pp. 208-31.

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[49]Santiago Lorente, "Así es la religiosidad en nuestro país, in Cambio Social y Religión en España, eds. Paulina Almerich et al. (Barcelona: Editorial Fontanella, 1975), pp. 117-24.

[50]Santiago Petscher, La Iglesia en la España de Franco (Madrid: Ediciones Sedmay, 1977), pp. 174-75.

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[53]Karen Wiley, The status of pre-college science, mathematics, and social science education: 1955-1975. Vol. III: Social science education. Report to the National Science Foundation. (Boulder: Social Science Education Consortium, Inc., 1977); B. Frank Brown, Education for Responsible Citizenship.

[54]Ibid.

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